This stock options targeted legislation, introduced by Senators Carl Levin
(D-MI) and John McCain (R-AZ) ties the amount of a company's corporate tax
deduction directly to the amount expensed on the company’s earnings statement.
The result for a company translates to the loss of its corporate tax deduction,
unless that company expenses the stock option value on their earnings statement.
This change in reporting practice imposes a large tax increase on companies who
issue broad-based employee stock options.
Effects of the Levin/McCain Bill
In essence, the Levin-McCain bill (S. 1940) uses a tax hammer to get
companies to change their accounting treatment of stock options. This is
ultimately damaging to the employee workforce who benefit from the investment in
the future value of their employer. The result would likely mean the end of
stock options, and the loss of a large financial investment opportunity for
company employees.
Why is the Levin/McCain Bill is Unnecessary?
Proponents of S. 1940 argue that current accounting rules do not provide
enough information to investors about the cost of stock options to companies.
However, current accounting and tax rules governing stock options resolve
this concern. A company may expense the stock option grants on its earnings
statement or comport with the Financial Accounting Standards Board’s (FASB)
requirement that companies provide investors with detailed information in a
footnote in their financial statement showing the potential impact of the stock
options.
Shareholder advocates supported this approach because it very much improved
the information available to investors. Furthermore, the information provided in
the footnote clearly shows the effect stock options have had on dilution of
stock value and the net profit of the company.
The Levin/McCain bill confuses current rules and proposes that:
- companies should only be allowed to retain their corporate tax deduction
for stock options if they record stock options on their earnings statement
as an expense, and
- the amount of the corporate tax deduction should be tied to the amount
recorded as an expense on the company earnings statement
Companies are unable to expense stock options as proposed in S. 1940 for two
main reasons:
- No money has changed hands. When a company grants a stock option to
an employee, no money has changed hands. Rather, the employee has a future
right to purchase the company’s stock and become an owner of the company.
There is not a definite value of the option at grant, and therefore it is very
hard to report that value on a company’s earnings statement at the time of
grant.
- Employees may never exercise, or buy, the stock. Employees may leave
the company before the stock option vests, or the stock value may have
plummeted below the grant price and so the employee will not likely exercise
the option at a loss. If the Levin/McCain bill passes, a company will be
forced to charge an expense to earnings, despite the unpredictability of the
final outcome of the stock option.
Current Rules are not Broken
The accounting and tax rules governing stock options currently work. Defined
briefly:
- At the time the employee is given or granted a stock option, no money has
changed hands but rather an employee merely has the future right to buy the
stock at a set price (the grant).
- When a stock option is exercised, the employee has purchased the
stock. The employee must pay income taxes on the value of the stock
appreciation since the time of grant.
- The employer likewise is entitled to an income tax deduction in the amount
that the employee is required to include as income. The tax law treats the
transaction as a bargain sale to an employee and recognizes the employer
could have sold the stock option on the open market and received the market
price.
- Because stock options are not compensation for past work, but are rather
an incentive for future performance, most companies choose to report this
information in the footnote disclosure. (Compensation is recorded in the
company’s earnings statement.)
Would enactment of the Levin-McCain bill, prevent the kind of accounting
irregularities presented in the Enron case?
No. The bill confuses financial and tax accounting, and could result in
companies providing less information to investors.
Didn’t Enron somehow sidestep paying taxes because of the stock options
they issued?
Proponents of the Levin/McCain bill complain that Enron reduced its tax
liability by claiming $600 million in corporate tax deductions from the exercise
by its employees of stock options. Every corporate tax deduction from stock
option exercises is determined by the taxable income realized by the employee.
Employees pay tax at higher rates than corporations. The tax paid by the
employee more than offsets the deduction claimed by the company, thereby
enhancing tax receipts.
For more information, contact Caroline Hurley: